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This lecture addresses the topic of ‘new mechanisms for punishing atrocities 
in Non-International Armed Conflicts’ (‘NIACs’). I take it as a given that there 
are numerous non-international armed conflicts occurring worldwide, including 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria and Syria and that there will continue to be such 
conflicts in the future. I also take it as a given that there are serious atrocities 
occurring as a part of those NIACs, including the targeting of civilians; leading 
to their death and injury, enslavement, forcible transfers of populations, enforced 
disappearances, torture, sexual violence and persecution, just to name a few. 
And, finally, I take it as a given that we would like to find a way to deter and to 
punish such atrocities. 
To that end, my lecture will focus on the value in this context of pursuing 
robust action against ‘crimes against humanity’. First, I will begin by indicating 
briefly why the concept of crimes against humanity is especially useful when 
dealing with NIACs. Secondly, I will indicate that we have had considerable 
success in creating international tribunals, notably the International Criminal 
Court (‘ICC’), for prosecuting such crimes, but far less success in doing so 
through national courts. Thirdly, I will argue that key mechanisms for 
developing national capacity for such prosecutions, as well as associated  
interstate cooperation, may lie in a new multilateral convention on the prevention 
and punishment of crimes against humanity.1 
 * Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law 
School; Special Rapporteur for Crimes against Humanity, United Nations International Law 
Commission. These remarks were the opening address at a conference on ‘Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (NIAC): Developments and Challenges’ held at Melbourne Law School on 
17 March 2015. They draw upon the analysis set forth in my first report to the UN 
International Law Commission. See Sean D Murphy, Special Rapporteur, First Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity, UN GAOR, 67th sess, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/680 (17 February 2015). 
 1 For prior arguments in favour of such a convention, see M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘“Crimes 
against Humanity”: The Need for a Specialized Convention’ (1994) 31 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 457; M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Crimes against Humanity: The Case for a 
Specialized Convention’ (2010) 9 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 575; 
Leila Nadya Sadat (ed), Forging a Convention for Crimes against Humanity (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011); Morten Bergsmo and Song Tianying (eds), On the Proposed 
Crimes Against Humanity Convention (Torkel Opsahl, 2014). 
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I CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND NIACS 
‘Crimes against humanity’ are crimes that are so heinous — so  
horrible — that they are viewed as an attack on the very quality of being human. 
Moreover, such crimes are so heinous that they are an attack not just upon the 
immediate victims, but also upon all of humanity, and hence the entire 
community of humankind has an interest in their punishment.2 
By way of example, the torture of an individual by a government official in 
the course of a NIAC is an international crime, but standing alone it is not a 
crime against humanity. If that act of torture occurs, however, as a part of a 
widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population — perhaps pursuant 
to a governmental policy that is targeting thousands of civilians for  
torture — then the individual act of torture becomes a crime against humanity. In 
essence, when the perpetrator is a part of a broad campaign to do serious harm to 
a civilian population, the individual crime becomes even more aggravated and 
merits special treatment as a crime against humanity. Such violence is one of the 
main concerns that arises in most NIACs. 
Although the codification and application of crimes against humanity has led 
to some doctrinal divergences, the concept contains a few basic elements that are 
common across all formulations: 
• First, these crimes are international crimes; it matters not whether the 
national law of the territory on which the act was committed has 
criminalised the conduct. 
• Secondly, these crimes are directed against a civilian population and 
hence, have a certain scale or systematic nature that generally 
extends beyond isolated incidents of violence and that are usually 
associated with a state or organisational policy. 
• Thirdly, these crimes concern the most heinous acts of violence and 
persecution known to humankind: murder; torture; sexual violence; 
and so on. 
Two further elements are especially important in the context of NIACs. They 
are that: 
• Fourthly, these crimes can be committed within the territory of a 
single state or can be committed across borders. Thus, these crimes 
can arise in the context of either international or non-international 
armed conflicts. 
• Fifthly, these crimes can be committed either by state actors or by 
non-state actors, at least when the latter act as part of an 
organisational policy to commit the attack. As such, a rebel group 
engaged in a NIAC against its government is subject to the 
prohibition of these crimes. 
Some historical background may help explain the emergence of these 
elements. Up until the 20th century, little attention was paid to whether 
 2 Hannah Arendt characterised the Holocaust as a ‘new crime, the crime against  
humanity — in the sense of a crime “against the human status”, or against the very nature of 
mankind’. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil 
(Viking, 1965) 268. 
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international law prohibited violence by a government directed against its own 
people. Hence, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 addressed conduct 
occurring as a part of interstate armed conflicts, but did not address atrocities 
inflicted domestically by a government.3 
In the aftermath of World War I, further thought was given to whether 
international law regulated such atrocities. In 1919, a special legal commission 
advocated for the inclusion of provisions in the Treaty of Versailles4 on 
prosecuting leaders for committing atrocities against their own people,5 but no 
such provisions were ultimately adopted, and no prosecutions for crimes against 
humanity ensued. 
II PROSECUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 
A International and Special Courts or Tribunals 
Even so, the seeds were sown for such prosecutions in the aftermath of World 
War II. The 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal established at 
Nürnberg (‘Nürnberg Charter’)6 included ‘crimes against humanity’ as a 
component of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Nürnberg Charter defined such 
crimes in art 6(c) as: 
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not 
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.7 
Notice that this definition of crimes against humanity was linked to the 
existence of an international armed conflict — the acts only constituted crimes 
against humanity if committed ‘in execution of or in connection with’ a crime 
against peace or a war crime. In fact, the basic justification at that time for 
intruding into matters that traditionally were within the national jurisdiction of a 
state was the crime’s connection to interstate armed conflict. 
The Nürnberg Tribunal, charged with trying the senior political and military 
leaders of the Third Reich, convicted several defendants for crimes against 
humanity committed during the war.8 ‘Crimes against humanity’ were also 
 3 See, eg, Hague Convention (II) with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
opened for signature 29 July 1899 (entered into force 4 September 1900); See, eg, Hague 
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for signature 18 
October 1907, [1910] UKTS 9 (entered into force 26 January 1910). 
 4 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of 
Versailles), opened for signature 28 June 1919, 2 USTS 43 (entered into force 10 January 
1920). 
 5 Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties, ‘Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference’ (29 March 1919) 
partially reprinted in (1920) 14 American Journal of International Law 95. 
 6 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, 82 UNTS 279 (signed and entered into force 8 August 1945) annex 
(‘Charter of the International Military Tribunal’). 
 7 Ibid.  
 8 See Roger S Clark, ‘Crimes against Humanity at Nuremberg’ in George Ginsburgs and V N 
Kudriavtsev (eds), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1990) 
177. 
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included in the 1946 Charter for the Tokyo Tribunal9 but ultimately no persons 
were convicted of such crimes by that tribunal. 
There was hope that, in the 1950s, it would be possible to establish a 
permanent international criminal court, but the United Nations General 
Assembly deferred action, and throughout the period of the Cold War no further 
international tribunals were developed. 
In 1993, however, the UN Security Council established the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY’).10 Article 5 of the Statute 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (‘ICTY 
Statute’) included ‘crimes against humanity’ as part of the ICTY’s jurisdiction. 
The chapeau of that article reads that the ICTY ‘shall have the power to 
prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed 
conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any 
civilian population’.11 
Notice how this language does not require any connection to an international 
armed conflict, but does require a connection to an armed conflict. The historical 
record indicates that the drafters were interested in having crimes against 
humanity in the former Yugoslavia prosecuted whether or not that conflict was 
ultimately characterised by the tribunal as international in character. Hence, the 
ICTY Statute established a definitive break from the Nürnberg Charter so as to 
take account of crimes against humanity in a NIAC. 
Article 5 of the ICTY Statute then proceeds to list several crimes, such as 
murder, extermination and enslavement. Through its extensive jurisprudence, the 
ICTY also developed important guidance as to exactly what must be proven 
when prosecuting an individual for crimes against humanity. Ultimately, a large 
number of defendants before the ICTY were successfully convicted of such 
crimes.12  
In 1994, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR’).13 Article 3 of the Statute of the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda (‘ICTR Statute’) established ‘crimes against humanity’ as 
part of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.14 Although art 3 retained the same list of 
proscribed acts as existed for the ICTY, the chapeau’s language abandoned any 
nexus to armed conflict. Like the ICTY, the jurisprudence of the ICTR provides 
important guidance as to what must be proven when prosecuting an individual 
 9 See International Military Tribunal for the Far East, TIAS 1589 (proclaimed 19 January 
1946, amended 26 April 1946) art 5(c). 
 10 See SC Res 827, UN SCOR, 48th sess, 3217th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/827 (25 May 1993). 
 11 See SC Res 955, UN SCOR, 49th sess, 3453rd mtg, UN Doc S/Res/955 (8 November 1994). 
 12 Leila Nadya Sadat, ‘Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age’ (2013) 107 American 
Journal of International Law 334, 342–6. 
 13 See SC Res 955, UN SCOR, 49th sess, 3453rd mtg, UN Doc S/Res/955 (8 November 1994). 
 14 Ibid annex (‘Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda’) art 3.  
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for crimes against humanity. And here, too, many defendants before the ICTR 
were convicted of such crimes.15  
As is well-known, negotiations in the late 1990s led to the adoption in 1998 of 
the Rome Statute, establishing the ICC.16 Article 5 of the Rome Statute includes 
crimes against humanity within the ICC’s jurisdiction. Article 7(1) defines what 
is meant by a ‘crime against humanity’: ‘For the purpose of this Statute, “crime 
against humanity” means any of the following acts when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack’. 
Article 7(1) then proceeds to list a series of acts: murder; extermination; 
enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment in 
violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape or other forms 
of sexual violence; persecution; enforced disappearance; the crime of apartheid; 
and other inhuman acts of a similar character intentionally causing great 
suffering.17  
Article 7(2) provides a series of definitions, the first of which is especially 
important.18 Article 7(2)(a) defines an ‘[a]ttack directed against any civilian 
population’ as meaning: ‘[A] course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such 
attack’.19 
One thing to note about this definition is that, like the ICTR Statute, there is 
no requirement that the underlying acts be in connection with an ‘international 
armed conflict’, nor even any requirement that they be in connection with an 
‘armed conflict’. So atrocities committed within a NIAC are fully covered. 
Another thing to note is that the words ‘pursuant to or in furtherance of a State 
or organizational policy to commit such an attack’ (emphasis added) 
contemplate crimes against humanity perpetrated by non-state perpetrators. 
Jurisprudence from the ICC suggests that ‘organizational’ includes any 
organisation or group with the capacity and resources to plan and carry out a 
widespread or systematic attack. For example, the ICC indicted for crimes 
against humanity Germain Katanga, who was the leader of an armed militia 
operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (‘DRC’) known as the 
Patriotic Resistance Force in Ituri. In referring to the policy requirement for the 
crime, the Pre-Trial Chamber in the Katanga case stated: ‘Such a policy may be 
made either by groups of persons who govern a specific territory or by any 
organisation with the capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack 
 15 Sadat, above n 12, 346–9. See also Stephan Meseke, ‘La contribution de la jurisprudence 
des tribunaux pénaux internationaux pour l’ex-Yougoslavie et le Rwanda à la concrétisation 
de l’incrimination du crime contre l’humanité [The Contribution of the Jurisprudence of 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 
Criminalisation of Crimes Against Humanity]’ in Mario Chiavario (ed), La justice pénale 
internationale entre passé et avenir [International Justice Criminal between the Past and the 
Future] (Dalloz, 2004) 173. 
 16 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 
UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002). 
 17 Ibid.  
 18 Ibid. 
 19 Ibid. 
                                                 
2015] New Mechanisms for Punishing Atrocities in NIACs 303 
against a civilian population’.20 So this, too, is an important feature of crimes 
against humanity for NIACs, where there is invariably a non-state actor group 
involved in the conflict. 
Since entry into force of the Rome Statute in July 2002, several defendants 
have been indicted and some convicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity. 
For example, in March 2014, the ICC Trial Chamber II issued its judgment that 
Katanga committed murder, through other persons, as a crime against humanity 
during an attack in February 2003 on a village in the DRC.21  
Crimes against humanity have also featured in the jurisdiction of ‘hybrid’ 
tribunals that contain a mixture of international law and national law elements. 
The Sierra Leone Special Court, established in 2002 pursuant to an agreement 
between Sierra Leone and the UN, includes crimes against humanity as a part of 
the Special Court’s jurisdiction.22 Several defendants have been indicted and 
some convicted by the Special Court for crimes against humanity, including the 
former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor.23 
Special courts have been set up within a few national legal systems (at times 
with international judges participating) and some of these courts have exercised 
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. For example, the East Timor Special 
Panels, established in 2000, had jurisdiction over crimes against humanity 
committed between January and October 1999 in East Timor.24 The relevant 
language of that tribunal’s statute was almost a verbatim repetition of art 7 of the 
Rome Statute, and the Special Panels convicted several defendants for crimes 
against humanity. Likewise, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia, established by Cambodia in 2001, included within art 5 of its statute 
‘the power to bring to trial all Suspects who committed crimes against 
humanity’,25 leading to the trial of certain defendants for such crimes.  
Finally, crimes against humanity have also featured at times in the 
jurisprudence of regional human rights courts and tribunals, such as the  
 20 Prosecutor v Katanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) (International Criminal 
Court, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No ICC-01/04-01/07, 30 September 2008) 126–7 [396]. 
 21 Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) (International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber II, Case No 
ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014) 155 [436], 158 [443]–[444]. 
 22 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed 16 January 2002, 2178 UNTS 
137 (entered into force 12 April 2002); Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, UN Doc S/2000/915 (2000) enclosure 
(‘Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone’). 
 23 Prosecutor v Taylor (Judgment) (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Case 
No SCSL-03-01-A, 26 September 2013). See René van der Wolf (ed), The Case against 
Charles Taylor (International Courts Association, 2013). 
 24 On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal Offences, 
UN Doc UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (6 June 2000) s 5. 
 25 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the 
Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 2004 
(Cambodia) art 5. 
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights26 and the European Court of Human 
Rights.27  
In light of such historical developments, it is now well-settled that, under 
international law, criminal responsibility attaches to an individual for committing 
crimes against humanity, including those occurring in NIACs. As the ICTY Trial 
Chamber in the Tadić case indicated, ‘since the Nürnberg Charter, the 
customary status of the prohibition against crimes against humanity and the 
attribution of individual criminal responsibility for their commission have not 
been seriously questioned’.28  
B National Courts 
These are impressive achievements with respect to international tribunals. But 
how have crimes against humanity fared under national law? 
The national laws of several states do address in some fashion crimes against 
humanity, thereby allowing national prosecutions falling within the scope of 
those laws. Indeed, in the decades following Nürnberg, various national 
prosecutions occurred, such as the Eichmann and Demjanjuk cases in Israel, the 
Menten case in the Netherlands, the Barbie and Touvier cases in France and the 
Finta, Mugesera and Munyaneza cases in Canada.29 Crimes against humanity 
typically arose in the context of criminal prosecutions, but they also arose in the 
context of extradition or immigration proceedings. 
In recent years, under the influence of the Rome Statute, many states have 
adopted or amended national laws that criminalise crimes against humanity. For 
example, I note that there are two federal statutes in Australia that concern 
prosecutions in Australia for crimes against humanity: (1) the Criminal Code Act 
of 1995;30 and (2) the International Criminal Court (Consequential 
Amendments) Act of 2002.31 Together, the two statutes provide that Australian 
courts have jurisdiction in cases involving crimes against humanity, even if the 
offences are also crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. Further, jurisdiction is 
available whether or not the offence was committed in Australia, but the 
 26 See, eg, Javier Dondé Matute, ‘Los elementos contextuales de los crímenes de lesa 
humanidad y la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos’ [Contextual Elements of 
Crimes against Humanity in the Inter-American Court] in Kai Ambos, Ezequiel Malarino 
and Gisela Elsner (eds), Sistema Interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos y 
Derecho Penal internacional [Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights 
and International Criminal Law] (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011) vol 2, 205. 
 27 See, eg, Korbely v Hungary (Judgment) [2008] IV Eur Court HR 299, 348 [82]. 
 28 Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
Trial Chamber, Case No IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997) 224 [623]. 
 29 A-G (Israel) v Eichmann [Israel Supreme Court] (appeal judgment) No 336/51 (29 May 
1962); State of Israel v Ivan (John) Demjanjuk [Jerusalem District Court] (trial judgment) 
No 373/86 (18 April 1988); Ivan (John) Demjanjuk v State of Israel [Israel Supreme Court] 
(appeal judgment) No 347/88 (29 July 1993); Menten v Federal Republic of Germany 
(1987) 101 ILR 443 [The Hague Court of Appeal]; Cour de cassation [French Court of 
Cassation], 85-95166, 20 December 1985; Cour de cassation [French Court of Cassation], 
92-82409, 27 November 1992; R v Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701; Minister of Citizen and 
Immigration v Mugesera [2005] 2 SCR 100; Munyaneza v The Queen [2014] QCCA 906 
(Quebec Court of Appeal). 
 30 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
 31 International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002 (Cth). 
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Attorney-General must give permission for charges to be brought under the 
relevant provisions. 
Various studies have attempted to compile and analyse the scope of such 
national laws, both in terms of the substance of the crimes and the circumstances 
when jurisdiction may be exercised over such crimes. For example, in 2013 the 
George Washington University Human Rights Clinic in Washington DC 
published a study entitled ‘Comparative Law Study and Analysis of National 
Legislation Relating to Crimes Against Humanity and Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction’,32 which reached several interesting conclusions, some of which I 
would like to share with you. 
First, the 2013 study canvassed the findings of earlier studies and found that, 
when read collectively, those earlier studies indicated that: 
• At best, 54 per cent of UN member states have some form of national 
law relating to crimes against humanity; 33 and 
• At best, 66 per cent of Rome Statute parties have some form of 
national law relating to crimes against humanity.34  
Secondly, the 2013 study undertook an in-depth, qualitative review of the 
national laws of a sample of 83 states. That review concluded that only 41 per 
cent of states in the sample actually possessed a national law specifically on 
‘crimes against humanity’.35 Of the 58 Rome Statute parties within the sample of 
83 states, the review indicated that just 48 per cent of them possessed a national 
law specifically on ‘crimes against humanity’. 
Thirdly, for the 34 states that possessed a national law specifically on ‘crimes 
against humanity’, the 2013 study analysed closely the provisions of those laws. 
Of those states, only 29 per cent adopted verbatim the text of art 7 of the Rome 
Statute when defining the crime.36 As such, of the 83 states within the sample, 
only about 12 per cent adopted the formulation of Rome Statute art 7 in its 
entirety. Instead, most of the 34 states possessing a national law on ‘crimes 
against humanity’ deviated from the language of art 7, some in a very substantial 
way. 
Finally, the 2013 study analysed whether the 34 states that possess a national 
law specifically on ‘crimes against humanity’ could exercise jurisdiction over a 
non-national offender who commits the crime abroad against non-nationals. The 
study concluded that only about 25 per cent of the states within the sample were 
able to exercise such jurisdiction over ‘crimes against humanity’. Further, of the 
58 Rome Statute parties within the sample, only 33 per cent possess a national 
 32 International Human Rights Law Clinic, ‘Comparative Law Study and Analysis of National 
Legislation relating to Crimes against Humanity and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (Report, 
George Washington University Law School, July 2013), updated and reprinted in part in 
Arturo J Carrillo and Annalise K Nelson, ‘Comparative Law Study and Analysis of National 
Legislation relating to Crimes Against Humanity and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction’ (2014) 46 
George Washington International Law Review 481. 
 33 Ibid 487. 
 34 Ibid 488. 
 35 Ibid 493. 
 36 Ibid 492.  
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law specifically on ‘crimes against humanity’ and are able to exercise such 
jurisdiction.37  
This unevenness in the adoption of national laws relating to crimes against 
humanity has collateral consequences with respect to interstate cooperation in 
seeking to sanction offences. Existing bilateral and multilateral agreements on 
mutual legal assistance and on extradition typically require that the offence at 
issue be criminalised in the jurisdictions of both the requesting and requested 
states (a requirement referred to as ‘double criminality’); if their respective 
national laws are not comparable, then cooperation usually is not required. With 
a large number of states having no national law on crimes against humanity, and 
with significant discrepancies among the national laws of states that have 
criminalised the offence, there exist at present considerable impediments to  
interstate cooperation.  
Further, the absence in most states of national laws that allow for the exercise 
of jurisdiction over non-nationals for crimes against humanity inflicted upon 
non-nationals abroad means that offenders often may seek sanctuary by moving 
to a state unconnected with the crime. Even in circumstances in which states 
have adopted harmonious national laws on crimes against humanity, there may 
exist no treaty obligation as between the states to cooperate with respect to the 
offence, including by way of an obligation to extradite or prosecute the offender. 
III INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S PROJECT ON CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY 
Principally to address this unevenness in national laws, in July 2014 the 
International Law Commission (‘the Commission’) embarked on a project to 
develop draft articles for what might become a new convention on the prevention 
and punishment of crimes against humanity.38 The Commission appointed me to 
serve as special rapporteur for the project. 
The project will involve preparing a series of draft articles beginning in the 
summer of 2015 and continuing for the next few years, which will likely contain 
at least the following elements: 
• An obligation upon states to prevent crimes against humanity; 
• An obligation upon states to incorporate crimes against humanity 
into their national law; 
• An obligation upon states to exercise jurisdiction over acts that 
constitute crimes against humanity when they occur in their territory 
or by their nationals, or when an offender who allegedly committed 
such crimes turns up in their territory; 
• An obligation upon states to either submit the offender to prosecution 
or to extradite the offender (aut dedere aut judicare); 
• An obligation upon states to engage in mutual legal assistance with 
other states; and 
 37 Ibid 505–13. 
 38 See International Law Commision, Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, UN GAOR, 69th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/69/10 (5  
May–6 June and 7 July–8 August 2014) 247 [266]. See also Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, GA Res 69/118, 69th sess, Agenda Item 
78, UN Doc A/RES/69/118 (18 December 2014) para 7.  
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• An obligation to go to international dispute resolution in the event of 
a disagreement between states as to the application or interpretation 
of the agreement. 
One reason for such a convention is to help fill a gap not just in national laws 
but in our existing treaty regimes — we have a Genocide Convention39 to 
address genocide and we have the 1949 Geneva Conventions40 to address serious 
war crimes, but we have no convention focused on nationalisation of crimes 
against humanity, nor on interstate cooperation with respect to such crimes. 
When embarking on this project, one issue that the Commission considered 
was how such a convention would relate to the Rome Statute. Certainly, a 
convention on crimes against humanity should avoid any conflicts with the Rome 
Statute, given the large number of states that have adhered to it, and should draw 
upon the language of the Rome Statute, as well as associated instruments and 
jurisprudence, whenever appropriate.  
For example, in the event that a state party to the Rome Statute receives a 
request from the ICC for the surrender of a person to the ICC and also receives a 
request from another state for extradition of the person pursuant to the proposed 
convention, art 90 of the Rome Statute provides a procedure to resolve the 
competing requests. The draft articles of the proposed convention should be 
crafted to ensure that states party to the Rome Statute can follow that procedure 
even after joining the convention on crimes against humanity. 
Moreover, in several ways the adoption of a convention could promote 
desirable objectives not addressed in the Rome Statute, while simultaneously 
supporting the mandate of the ICC. 
First, the Rome Statute regulates relations between its states party and the 
ICC, but does not regulate matters among the parties themselves (nor among 
parties and non-parties). In other words, the Rome Statute is focused on the 
‘vertical’ relationship of states to the ICC, but not the ‘horizontal’ relationship of 
interstate cooperation. Part IX of the Rome Statute on ‘International Cooperation 
and Judicial Assistance’ implicitly acknowledges that interstate cooperation on 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC should continue to operate outside the 
Rome Statute, but does not direct itself to the regulation of that cooperation. A 
convention on crimes against humanity could expressly address interstate 
cooperation on the investigation, apprehension, prosecution and punishment in 
national legal systems of persons who commit crimes against humanity, an 
objective fully consistent with the Rome Statute’s object and purpose. 
Secondly, the ICC is focused upon punishment of persons for the crimes 
within its jurisdiction, not upon steps that should be taken by states to prevent 
 39 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, open for signature 
9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951).  
 40 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, opened for signature 12 
August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 
UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950); Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, open for signature 12 August 1949, 75 
UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950).  
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such crimes before they happen. A new convention on crimes against humanity 
could include obligations relating to prevention that draw upon comparable 
obligations in other treaties, such as the Genocide Convention and the 
Convention against Torture,41 as well as recent jurisprudence, such as the 
International Court of Justice’s decisions in the Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia 
and Montenegro and Croatia v Serbia genocide cases.42 As such, a convention 
on crimes against humanity could clarify a state’s obligation to prevent crimes 
against humanity and provide a basis for holding states accountable in that 
regard. 
Thirdly, while the ICC is a key international institution for prosecution of 
high-level persons who commit these crimes, the ICC was not designed (nor 
given the resources) to prosecute all persons responsible for crimes against 
humanity. Rather, the ICC is predicated on the notion that, in the first instance, 
national jurisdictions are the proper place for prosecution in the event that 
appropriate national laws are in place (the principle of complementarity).43 
Further, in some circumstances the ICC may wish to transfer a suspect in its 
custody for prosecution in a national jurisdiction, but may be unable to do so if 
the national jurisdiction is not capable of charging the suspect with crimes 
against humanity. Given that the ICC does not have the capacity to prosecute all 
persons responsible for crimes against humanity, or to strengthen national legal 
systems in this regard, a new convention could help reinforce the ICC by 
developing greater capacity at the national level for prevention and punishment 
of such crimes. 
Fourthly, and relatedly, a convention on crimes against humanity would 
require the enactment of national laws that criminalise crimes against humanity 
which, as I have discussed, currently many states have not done, including many 
states party to the Rome Statute. 
As such, rather than conflict with other treaty regimes, a well-designed 
convention on crimes against humanity could help fill a gap in existing treaty 
regimes and, in doing so, simultaneously reinforce those regimes. 
IV CONCLUSION 
 Let me conclude by noting that, when one looks across the globe at various 
areas of conflict, it is disheartening to see that crimes against humanity appear to 
be occurring in many places, most notably in NIACs. The system of international 
law has come very far in defining what is meant by such crimes and by 
establishing international courts and tribunals with jurisdiction over such crimes. 
 41 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 
June 1987).  
 42 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Judgment) [2007] ICJ Rep 
43; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Croatia v Serbia) (Judgment) (International Court of Justice, General List No 
118, 3 February 2015).  
 43 See Mohamed M El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity in International Criminal 
Law: Origin, Development and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008); Jann K Kleffner, 
Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (Oxford 
University Press, 2008).  
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But much remains to be done in developing national laws, in promoting 
cooperation among states for investigation, prosecution or extradition of 
offenders and in finding ways to help prevent such crimes from occurring ab 
initio. Perhaps a new convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes 
against humanity — such as currently exist for genocide and serious war  
crimes — would help in addressing such problems. Indeed, a global convention 
on prevention, punishment and interstate cooperation with respect to crimes 
against humanity appears to be a missing piece in the current framework of 
international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international 
human rights law. Such a convention could help to further stigmatise such 
egregious conduct, could draw further attention to the need for its prevention and 
punishment and could help to harmonise national laws relating to such conduct, 
thereby opening the door to more meaningful interstate cooperation on the 
investigation, prosecution and extradition for such crimes. 
Whether or not this initiative for a new convention is the means for doing so, 
stopping crimes against humanity in non-international armed conflicts is one of 
our signature challenges for the 21st century. 
